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After the evolution of the third theory the second theory
was absolutely abandoned for a long time. It will therefore
* This article is a consideration of three theories as to the exclusiveness of the power of Congress over interstate and foreign. commerce
which have been advanced in the opinions of the Supreme Court of
the United States
In the preceding part of the article the three theories were considered
both from the standpoint of general principles and from that of the
actual decisions of the court. The conclusion was reached that on
general principles only one theory, called for convenience the exclusive-reserved powers theory, is sound, and that, apart from a few exceptions noted, the decisions of the court wherever either of the other
theories conflict with it are consistent with that theory only.
Following that a chronological review of the cases with quotatioris
from the opinions was carried far enough' to show the origin of the
three theories.
This review of the bases is here continued for the purpose of tracing
the theories, their discussion, and disposition through the succeeding
cases.
The three theories considered and whose origin was shown, with the
designations for convenience attached to them, are: First, the exclusivereserved powers theory, to the effect that Congress has exclusive power
of direct regulation of interstate and foreign commerce; but the states
may, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, exercise their
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be ignored, except when specially mentioned. It was later
re-introduced as a basis for three decisions. These were,
however, subsequently overruled, and the second theory disappeared again from the reasoning of the opinions. It was
revived again in one recent decision against the most emphatic dissents from four justices. The first and third
theories are traceable all through the decisions, first one then
the other prevailing, in some cases language appropriate to
one being used to express the other.
The consequent number of separate opinions and dissents
is remarkable.
It will be sufficient to give the decisions in the more important-cases, with a brief statement of the theories ori which
they are based.
In doing so numerous decisions on taxation will be
omitted, because they. all agree that if it be once decided that
a state tax falls directly on interstate commerce, and is not
merely a charge for service rendered, it is unconstitutional,
and this without respect to whether the tax is a local one for
local purposes or not.
It will be noticed that the decisions are in the main consistent, though if the reasoning were gone into fully, much
conflict and confusion would be seen. The reason for this
is that the local concurrent sovereignty theory was introduced originally in bridge and pilot cases, where the local
idea is especially prominent, and has largely been confined
in its application to those and similar cases-ferries, wharves,
etc. But the states reserved power over these subjects, so
that the reserved power theory leads to the same results in
reserved powers in local affairs, even though they thereby incidentally
and indirectly regulate interstate or foreign commerce.
Second, the general concurrent powers theory, to the effect that
Congress and the states have general concurrent jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce, and the states may make any regulations
of commerce they see fit within their own territories, which will be
valid unless they conflict with actual legislation by Congress.
Third, the local concurrent powers theory, growing out of an attempted combination of the two former theories, to the effect that in
matters permitting of local regulation the states have concurrent powers
with Congress, which they can exercise in the absence of conflicting
legislation by Congress, but that in matters permitting of but one
uniform or national system of regulation Congress has exclusive power.
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such cases. But when the two theories are applied to railroads, river, lake, and coastwise vessels, etc., they lead to
different results and produce confusion.
The next case is:
Gilman v. Philadelphia,3 Wallace, 713 (1865).
A statute of Pennsylvania authorizing the erection of a
bridge over the Schuylkill at Chestnut Street, Philadelphia,
was upheld against the objection of the owner of a wharf
just above.
The opinion by Swayne, J., after quoting Gibbons v.
Ogden to the effect that inspection laws, quarantine laws,
turnpike roads, ferries, etc., form a part of that immense
mass of legislation not granted to the General Government,
continues:
"Bridges are of the same nature with ferries, and are undoubtedly within the category thus laid down.
"The power to regulate commerce covers a wide field,
and embraces a great variety of subjects. Some of these
subjects call for uniform rules and national legislation;
others can be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different localities,
and limited in their operation to such localities respectively.
"To this extent the power to regulate commerce may be
exercised by the states."
" Whether the power in any given case is vested exclusively in the General Government depends upon the nature
of the subject to be regulated."
Here the two theories are attempted to be combined. This
inconsistency results. The court first says bridges are within
that class of subjects power over which was not granted to
Congress but is reserved by the states, and then proceeds to
say that the states regulate bridges by virtue of a power to
regulate interstate commerce in local affairs. But if bridges
are a subject over which power was not granted to Congress,
then the states regulate them by virtue of their reserved
power, and not under the power to regulate commerce, which
was granted to Congress. As said in Gibbons v. Ogden,
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"the sources of powers are distinct."
theories are confused.

In this case both

Crandallv. Nevada, 6 Wal. 35 (1867).
The state imposed a tax upon railroad and stage companies of one dollar for every passenger carried out of the
state.
The court refers to the fact that the exclusive nature of
the grant to Congress was left much in doubt by the earlier
cases, this being the case even as late as 1849, as shown by
the Passenger Cases; and that in Cooley v. Board of Wardens 2 2 the rule was formulated that "whenever subjects of
this power are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may justly be said
to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress."
The court then continues:
"Inasmuch, therefore, as the tax does not itself institute
any regulation of commerce of a national character, or which
has a uniform operation over the whole country, it is not
easy to maintain, in view of the principles on which those
cases were decided, that it -violates the clause of the Federal
Constitution which we have had under review."
(Case decided on other grounds, and held unconstitutional.)
The application of the local concurrent sovereignty theory
to the facts of the case should be noted. It is entirely logical. This is of particular interest in connection with the
next case.
Case of the State Freight Tax', 15 Wal. 232 (1872).
The court declared unconstitutional, so far as it applied to
interstate commerce, a statute of Pennsylvania imposing a
tax of two cents on every ton of freight carried by railroads.
The court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Strong, says:

3 Wal. 713.
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"It is not necessary to the present case to go at large
into the much-debated question whether the power given
to Congress by the Constitution to regulate commerce
among the states is exclusive. In the earlier decisions of
this court it was said to have been so entirely vested in
Congress that no part of it can be exercised by a state.
It has, indeed, often been argued, and sometimes intimated, by the court, that so far as Congress has not legislated on the subject, the states may legislate respecting
interstate commerce. Yet, if they can, why may they not
add regulations to commerce with foreign nations beyond
those made by Congress, if not inconsistent with them,
for the power over both foreign and interstate commerce
is conferred upon the Federal legislature by the same
words. And certainly it has never yet been decided by this
court that the power to regulate interstate, as well as foreign
commerce, is not exclusively in Congress. Cases that have
sustained state laws, alleged to be regulations of commerce
among the states, have been such as related to bridges or
dams across streams wholly within a state, police or.health
laws, or subjects of a kindred nature, not strictly commercial
regulations. The subjects were such, as in Gilnan v. Philadelphia, it was said 'can be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different
localities, and limited in their operation to such localities respectively.' However this may be, the rule has been asserted
with great clearness that whenever the subjects over which a
power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature
national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Surely transportation of passengers or merchandise through a state or from
one state to another is of this nature. It is of national importance that over that subject there should be but one regulating power, for, etc."
Five things will be especially noted.here. First, the statement that the earlier decisions held the exclusive theory;
second, that the court has never decided that the power is
not exclusively in Congress, because the cases apparently
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so holding related to subjects withirf the control of the
states; third, that the general concurrent theory, that the
states may legislate on interstate commerce in general, so
far as Congress has not, is touched upon and discarded;
fourth, that if the last theory were true, then the states could
regulate foreign commerce also, for the power over both is
conferred by the same words; and, fifth, that it is said to
be of national "importance" that over transportation there
should be but one regulating power.
The use of the word "importance" is significant. It
marks the introduction of .the idea of national expediency
into the decisions of the court. There are no fixed principles by which to determine what subjects fall within the
national and what within the local class, hence ideas of expediency are inseparable from the local concurrent powers
theory. But these are legislative questions, whereas the
only proper question for the court is the judicial one, Where
did the Constitution vest the power over commerce?
The present case is one where the two theories lead to
opposite results. The subject, taxation, is not "in its nature
national" and it does by its nature admit of more than " one
uniform system or plan of regulation." On the local concurrent powers theory the statute should be- held constitutional. But the importance of freedom from local taxation is so great that the court brushes aside the logic of the
theory, as followed in Crasndall v. Nevada (supra), and
renders a decision consistent with the exclusive-reserved
powers theory only. On the latter theory the tax is a direct
burden upon interstate commerce and therefore void.
Through all the succeeding cases on taxation, license
requirements, and regulation of rates and charges, with but
few exceptions, together with all other cases where the
theories conflict, this underlying idea of national "importance" has resulted in decisions inconsistent with a logical
application of the local concurrent powers theory and consistent only with the exclusive-reserved powers theory.
Only a few typical cases can be included in this review,
but the important fact should be kept in mind that throughout the cases where the theories conflict the decisions can be
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jogically deduced from the exclusive-reserved powers theory
only.
"National importance," under cover of strained applications of the local concurrent powers theory, has induced the
court to practically re-confer upon Congress the exclusive
power which, it is submitted, that "importance" caused the
framers of the Constitution to vest in Congress, and which
the exclusive-reserved powers.theory logically secures to it.
In this case while both theories are confused, the decision
is consistent only with the exclusive-reserved ppwers theory.
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275.
Holds that a license tax on pedlers for selling foreign
goods is in violation of the commerce clause; that the sale
of goods is a subject requiring national or uniform regulation.
The importance of the principle here involved is very
great, but that sales by pedlers can be regulated locally, and
that they do admit of "more than one uniform system, or
plan of regulation," can hardly be denied. The decision is
undoubtedly correct, but is inconsistent with the theory on
which it is based, namely, the local concurrent powers
theory.
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259
(1875).
A statute of New York required the master of every vessel from a foreign port to make a report of names, occupations, last residence, etc., of every passenger, and the
owner or consignee to give bond in three hundred dollars
against each passenger becoming a charge for four years;
or in lieu of said bond to pay one dollar and fifty cents for
each passenger.
In deciding against the constitutionality of the statute
the court first states emphatically that a state cannot, under
an expanded definition of the police power, or any other
power, attempt to control a subject over which exclusive
control has been confined to Congress. From this it proceeds to say that however difficult it may very often be to
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distinguish between the one class of legislation and the
other, "it is clear, from the nature of our complex form of
government, that, whenever the statute of a-state invades
the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the
Congress of the United States, it is void, no matter under
what class of powers it may fall, or how closely allied to
powers conceded to belong to the states."
"It is said, however, that, under the decisions of this
court, there is a kind of neutral ground, especially in that
covered by the regulation of commerce, which may be occupied by the states, and its legislation be valid so long as it
interferes with no act of Congress or treaty of the United
States.
"But this doctrine has always been controverted by this
court, and has seldom, if ever, been stated without dissent.
These decisions, however, all agree, that under the commerce clause of the Constitution, or within its compass,
there are powers which from their nature are exclusive in
Congress, etc."
"It is apparent, therefore, that, if there be a class of laws
which may be valid when passed by the states until the same
ground is occupied by a treaty or an act of Congress, this
statute is not of that class."
The court here distinctly condemns the local concurrent
powers theory, and questions the existence of the field of
concurrent or "neutral" sovereignty. The logic of the
opinion is clearly that of the exclusive-reserved powers
theory.
Sherlock et al. v. Alling, Adm'r, 9 3 U. S. 99 (876).
"Two boats engaged in interstate commerce on the Ohio
collided within the jurisdiction of Indiana, resulting in the
death of a passenger, whose administrator brought this
action under a statute of Indiana giving right of action to
personal representatives in case of death by tort."

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COMMERCE.

The opinion by Field, J., contains the following language:
"General legislation of this kind, prescribing the liabilities or duties of citizens of a state, without distinction as to
pursuit or calling, is not open to any valid objection because
it may affect persons engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. Objection might with equal propriety be urged
against legislation prescribing the form in which contracts
shall be authenticafed, or property descend or be distributed
on the death of its owner, because applicable to the contracts
or estates of persons engaged in such commerce."
"And it may be said, generally, that the legislation of a
state not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties, and liabilities of
citizens, and only indirectly and remotely affecting the operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens
within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or water,
or engaged in commerce, foreign or interstate, or in any
other pursuit. In our judgment the statute of Indiana falls
under this class."
This opinion bases the validity of the statute entirely upon
the reserved powers of the state, within which the power to
pass such a statute clearly lay, and confirms the exclusivereservedpowers theory.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. r113.
A statute of Illinois divided grain elevators and warehouses into three classes, and fixed maximum charges for
the storage of grain.
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155.
A statute of Iowa classified the railroads of the state and
established maximum rates of charges for freight and passengers thereon.
Peik v. Chicago and N. W. Ry Co., 9 4 U. S. 164.
A statute of Wisconsin classified the railroads of the
state, and established maximum rates for fare and freight
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on persons and property carried within the state, or taken
up outside and brought within, or taken up within and
carried without, but excepted all carried completely through
the state from point without to point without.
The statutes in all three of these cases were resisted in
so far as they regulated charges on interstate business, but
all three were held constitutional. The reasoning of the
court in all three of the cases is that though these instruments of commerce are engaged in interstate as well as state
commerce, the state may regulate them until Congress acts
with respect to their interstate relations, because they are
all situated within the state; and that the state is not deprived of this power merely because to exercise it "may
indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate
jurisdiction."
The language of the court on this point in the first case
is: "The warehouses of these plaintiffs in error are situ~ted and their business carried on within the limits of the
state of Illinois. They are used by those engaged in state
as well as those engaged in interstate commerce, but they
are no more necessarily a part of commerce itself than the
dray or the cart by which, but for them, grain* would be
transferred from one railroad station to another. Incidentally they may be connected with interstate commerce,
but not necessarily so. Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern, and, certainly, until Congress acts in reference
to their interstate relations, the state may exercise all the
powers of government over them, even though in so doing
it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction."
And in the third case: "The law is confined to state
commerce, or such interstate commerce as directly affects the
people of Wisconsin. Until Congress acts in reference to
the relations of this company to interstate commerce, it is
certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regulate its
fares, etc., so far as they are of domestic concern. With the
people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations.
Incidentally, these may reach beyond the state. But, certainly, until Congress undertakes to legislate for those who
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are without the state, Wisconsin may provide for those
within, even though it may indirectly affect those without."
This is simply saying that a state has full sovereignty
over interstate commerce to the extent that it, or its instruments, its subjects, and the people engaged in it, are within
the state, subject only to the power of Congress when exercised. It is the discarded general concurrent powers theory
of Mr. Justice Taney.
We shall see that it was very quickly again discarded, for
these cases were all soon overruled in this respect. But it
should be carefully noted because it again cropped up in a
recent important decision. The case, then, supports the
general concurrentpowers theory.
Foster v. Master and Wardens of New Orleans, 94
U. S. 246 (1876).
An act of Louisiana made it the duty of the Master and
Wardens of the port of New Orleans, and forbade others
under a penalty, to make surveys of hatches of sea-going
-vessels arriving, and to make a survey of damaged goods,
give certificates for sale at auction of damaged goods, etc.
Opinion by Swayne, J.:
"That the provisions of this act are regulations of both
foreign and interstate commerce is a proposition which requires no argument to support it. They are a clog and a
blow to all such commerce in the port to which they relate.
Their enactment involved a power which belongs exclusively
to Congress, and which a state could not, therefore, properly
exercise."

"The act is not, in the sense of the Constitution, an inspection law. The object of such laws is to certify the
quantity and value of articles imported, whether imports or
exports, for the protection of buyers and consumers."
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"The purpose of this act- is to furnish official evidence
for the parties immediately concerfied, and where the goods
are damaged, to provide for and regulate their sale."
Here is an example of a state statute as local in its operations as 'anything could well be, for it was confined to the
port of New Orleans, and did not regulate a vessel's conduct
outside that port. And yet it was held unconstitutional,
even in the absence o'f legislation by Congress. If the state
of Louisiana had concurrent sovereignty over matters of
local concern, this statute would be valid. The decision that
it is invalid is inconsistent with such theory. The case is
another illustration of circumstances where he two theories
lead to exactly opposite results, and the decision is another
instance o.f the important fact, wbrthy of the greatest consideration, that with but few exceptions wherever the
theories lead to opposite results the decisions of the court
are consistent with the exclusive-reserved powers theory
only.
McCready v. Virginia,94 U. S. 391 (1876).
The question was the constitutionality of a law of Virginia forbidding others than her citizens from planting
oysters in a certain stream within the state.
Held: The state owns the bed of the stream, subject only
to the rights of navigation; it owns the tide-waters themselves, and the fish in them so far as they are capable of
ownership while running. It is a property right. Regulation of navigation with respect to interstate and foreign
commerce has been granted to Congress, but there has been
no such grant of power over the fisheries. The state may
grant the use of its property to whomsoever it pleases. This
is nothing-more than a regulation of the use by the people
of the state of their common property.
This case is a good example of the fact that the so-called
right of the states to regulate interstate commerce in local
affairs is really not a right to regulate interstate commerce
at all, but is based on property rights and powers of sovereignty not granted to Congress. Thus the right to regu-
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late wharves is based upon the state's ownership of the land
below tide-water and under the beds of navigable streams.
Similarly the powers of the states over roads, ferries,
bridges, quarantine, etc., are based immediately, as said by
Chief-Justice Marshall, on the reserved powers of the
states. This case supports the exclusive-reserved powers
theory.
Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (1877).
A statute of Missouri prohibited the driving or c6nveying
of any Texan, Mexican, or Indian cattle into the state
between March i and November i in each year, and making
carriers liable for infection from such cattle carried through
the state.
The court said:
"It seems hardly necessary to argue at length that, unless
the statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the
police power of the state, it is a usurpation of the power
vested exclusively in Congress. It is a plain regulation of
interstate commerce, a regulation extending to prohibition.
Whatever may be the power of a state over commerce that
is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate
that which is interstate than it can that which is with foreign
nations. Power over one is given by the Constitution of the
United States to Congress in the same words in which it is
given over the other, and in both cases it'is necessarily
exclusizve.'"
"We are thus brought to the question whether the Missouri statute is a lawful exercise of the police power of the
state. .

.

. What that power is it is difficult to define with

sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making
regulations promotive of domestic order, morals, health, and
safety."
"All these exertions of power are in immediate connection with the protection of persons and property against
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noxious acts of other persons or such use of property as is
injurious to the property of others. They are self-defensive.

"But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police
power of a state, it cannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively to Congress by the Federal Constitution.
It cannot invade the domain of the National Government."

"It (i.e., a state) may not, under the cover of exerting
its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either
foreign or interstate commerce."
The court here points out that the statute is neither an
inspection nor a quarantine law, but an absolute prohibition,
applying to all cattle whether diseased or not, and then continues: " Such a statute, we do not doubt, it is beyond the
power of a state to enact. To hold otherwise would be to
ignore one of the leading objects which the Constitution of
the United States was designed to secure."

"The police power of a state cannot obstruct foreign
commerce or interstate commerce beyond the necessity for
its exercise, and under color of it objects not within its
scope cannot be secured at the expense of the protection
afforded by the Federal Constitution. And as its range
sometimes comes very near to the field committed by the
Constitution to Congress, it is the duty of the courts to'

guard vigilantly against any needless intrusion."
Here is a carefully considered express holding by the
court that the power of Congress over interstate commerce
is the same as its power over foreign commerce, and in both
cases-is exclusive. It also shows very clearly that the definition-of the police power cannot be so loosely expanded as
to permit the states to regulate commerce under cover of it.
This is important in view of some cases which seem to
expand the police power so as to almost make it synonymous
with sovereignty. Here, again, we have the court affirming
the exclusive-reserved powers theory.

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COMMERCE.

Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 (i877).
Under authority of a statute of Wisconsin defendants
built a lumber dam across a small navigable stream within
the state.
This was held constitutional, the court saying:
"The principle established by the decisions to which
we have referred is that, in regard to the powers conferred
by the commerce clause of the Constitution, there are some
which by their essential nature are exclusive in Congress,
and which the states can exercise under no circumstances;
while there are others which from their nature may be exercised by the statds until Congress shall see proper to cover
the ground by such legislation as that body may deem
appropriate to the subject. Of this class are pilotage and
other port regulations. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, etc.,
etc."
(Black Bird Creek Case and Gilman v. Philadelphiaare
declared in point, and their principles gone into.)
This opinion is obviously based on the local concurrent
sovereignty theory, and yet the application 6f this theory to
the case is not free from difficulty. Dams, such as the one in
this case, as likewise the dam in the Black Bird Creek Case,
might not be merely matters of local regulation, but might
be of national or even international importance in case vessels of other states or other nations wanted access to the
waters and places cut off. A similar difficulty exists in
applying the exclusive-reserved powers theory. In the application, however, of either theory it is evident that there
was no dcsire or intention to regulate or interfere with commerce, and that the actual interference therewith was
trifling. The dam in neither case was erected for the purpose of controlling the mcvement of vessels or navigation in
any way. Nor did the fact that the movement of vessels was
controlled help to provide water enough to float the logs or
to drain the marsh. It was their power over the water, and
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not the commerce upon it, which the states exercised in both
cases.
Power over their waters is nothing more than the sovereignty of the states over their territory, for bodies of
water are in law land covered by water. The states retain
all powers of sovereignty over their waters not granted to
Congress. Under their reserved powers they dredge and
improve their harbors, and the channels in their rivers and
lakes, erect breakwaters, regulate the erection of wharves,
construct dams in rivers for slack-water navigation, and
undertake other improvements. These affect-commerce, but
they are merely the development by the states of their own
territory in such a way as to increase the facilities f6r commerce; they are not control of commerce itself.
In the cases at present under consideration the burden
upon commerce was so trifling as to be practically ignored.
It was neither a n eans nor an end, but merely an indirect
and incidental effect. It would seem that neither of the two
cases should, therefore, be considered an invasion of the
power of Congress on either of the two theories. This case
comes under the local concurrent powers theory.
Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1877).
The question involved was the constitutionality as applied
to a steamer engaged in interstate carriage of passengers on
the Mississippi River of an act of Louisiana requiring common carriers to give all persons equal privileges in all parts
of the conveyances, without discrimination on account of
race or color.
Opinion by Waite, C. J.:
"There can be no doubt but that exclusive power has
been conferred upon Congress in respect to the regulation
of commerce among the several states. The difficulty has
never been as to-the existence of this power, but as to what,
is to be deemed an encroachmerit upon it; for, as has been
often said, 'legislation may in a great variety of ways
affect commerce and persons engaged in it without consti-
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tuting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution.'"

"Thus in Munn v. Illinois2 3 it was decided that a state
might regulate the charges of public warehouses."
By such statutes the states regulate, as a matter of
domestic concern, the instruments of commerce situated
wholly within their own jurisdictions, and over which they
have exclusive governmental control, except when employed in foreign or interstate commerce. As they can only
be used in the state, their regulations for all purposes may
properly be assumed by the state until Congress acts in reference to their foreign or interstate relations. When Congress does act, the state laws are superseded only to the
extent that they affect commerce outside the state as it
comes within the state."
"But we think that it may safely be said that state legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate
commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does
encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress. The
statute now under consideration, in our opinion, occupies
that position."
"While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the state, it must necessarily influence his
conduct to some extent in the management of his business
throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the state, or taken up
within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater
or less degree those taken up without and brought within,
and sometimes those taken up and put down without."

W94 U. S. 113.
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This opinion is quoted to illustrate the confusion of
theories. An express declaration that the power of Congress is exclusive is followed by approval of Munn v. Illinois, supra, and the idea of general concurrent sovereignty
underlying it.
It is said that the states may regulate for all purposes the
instruments of commerce within their limits until Congress
acts with reference to their interstate relations. If this is
so, then the states can regulate all interstate commerce until
Congress acts, because all persons and all instruments
actually engaged in interstate commerce are at all times in
one or another of the states.
This is the general concurrent powers theory; and is
flatly at variance with the exclusive-reserved powers theory
with which the opinion starts out. The result is that in this
case the two theories are confused.
County of Mobile v. Kimball, 1O2 U. S. 691 (188o).
Bill in equity to compel an issue of bonds to pay for improvements to the harbor of Mobile, ordered under an act
of Alabama. It was objected that the act conflicted with the
commercial power of Congress. The court in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Field revives the local concurrent theory into
full vigor, saying, among other things:
"The uniformity of commercial regulations, which the
grant to Congress was designed to secure against conflicting
state provisions, was necessarily intended only for cases
where such uniformity is practicable. Where from the
nature of the subject or the sphere of its operation the case
is local and limited, special regulations adapted to the immediate locality could only have been contemplated, state
action upon such subjects can constitute no interference
with the commercial power of Congress, for when that acts
the state authority is superseded."
If this doctrine were applied to transportation, local regulations would soon cripple it.
Note also the substitution and confusion of the idea of
uniform regulation for the idea of freedom from local regulation. There are many subjects which it would be unwise
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or impracticable to regulate uniformly, but which require
freedom from local control, and are best left to the operation
of natural laws. There are others which require national but
very ununiform regulation, as, for instance, transportation,
as witness the building of the Cumberland National Pike to
the West, the land grants to the first transcontinental railroads, the necessary differences in railroad rates in different
parts of the country, etc.
The introduction of the idea of uniformity obscures the
greater and more important object of freedom from local
regulation.
He also says what is rather remarkable in view of some
of the preceding cases-to wit:
"There have been, it is true, expressions by individual
judges of this court, going to the length that the mere grant
of the commercial power, anterior to any action of Congress
under it, is exclusive of all state authority; but there has
been no adjudication of the court to that effect."
The same decision in this case would be reached on the
reserved powers theory. The states did not surrender all
jurisdiction over or power to improve their bays and harbors
any more than they did in the case of roads, highways, and
their other territory. The decision is based on the local
concurrent powers theory.
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penna., 114 U. S. 196
(1884).
The question was thd right of Pennsylvania to impose a
tax on the capital stock of the Ferry Company, which was a
New Jersey corporation.
The opinion here is also by Mr. Justice Field, and following the same reasoning holds the tax unconstitutional as
being a state regulation of a subject, to wit, interstate carriage of persons and property, which requires uniformity of
regulation, and the exclusive control over which is therefore
in Congress.
Here again uniformity of regulation* is confused with
freedom from local regulation.
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The decision does not follow logically from the theory,
for the subject is essentially local.
The exclusive-reserved powers theory leads to the same
decision in this case, but logically, and on sound principles.
This tax was a direct burden on the privilege of doing interstate business, and therefore an invasion of the exclusive
power of Congress and void.
Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1884).
In this case Mr. Justice Bradley, after beginning with an
implied question of the local concurrent theory by saying
in effect that "if the power of Congress is not exclusive,
and the states may make local regulations," concludes that
the power is "so exclusive that no state has power to make
any law or regulation which will affect the free and unrestrained intercourse and trade between the states." But
this is the exclusive-reserved powers theory, and it would
have been more consistent to have started out with it.
He then quotes Railroad Co. v. Husen, supra, to the
effect that the power is exclusive, and says:
"In shot, it may be laid down as the settled doctrine of
this court, at this day, that a state can no mote regulate or
impede commerce among the several states than'it can regulate or impede commerce with foreign nations."
In view of this language it is surprising to find, as is the
case, that tolls and freights are included in the opinion as
subjects which the states can regulate. And in view of such
inclusion it is somewhat surprising to find Mr. Justice Bradley concurring in the decision in the next case to the effect
that the states cannot regulate freights.
Wabash, etc., Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886).
A statute of Illinois forbade railroads to charge less for
a long haul than a shorter haul. On the constitutionality of
this statute as applied to interstate commerce the court says,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Miller:
"It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the right of
continuous transportation from one end of the country to
the other is essential in modem times to that freedom of
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commerce from the restraints which the state might choose
to impose upon it, that the commerce clause was intended to
secure."
"And it would be a very feeble and almost useless provision, but poorly adapted to secure the entire freedom of
commerce among the states which was deemed essential to
a more perfect union by the framers of the Constitution, if,
at every stage of the transportation of goods and chattels
through the country, the state within whose limits a part
of this transportation must be done could impose regulations
concerning the price, compensation, or taxation, or any
other restrictive regulation interfering with and seriously
embarrassing this commerce."
It will be noted that this language is in direct conflict
with the decisions of the court in the three cases of Munn v.
Illinois; Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Iowa, and Peik v. Chicago,
etc., Ry.,2 4 quoted supra. It is not surprising, therefore, to
find that the court first mentions those three cases, and explains that on account of other more prominent questions
in them this point was passed upon with but little consideration.
Speaking of these three cases the opinion continues:
" Of the members of the court who concurred in those
opinions, there being two dissentients, but three remain, and
the writer of this opinion is one of the three. He is prepared
to take his share of the responsibility for the language
used in those opinions, including the extracts above presented. He does not feel called upon to say whether those
extracts justify the decision of the Illinois court in the present case. It will be seen, from the opinions themselves, and
from the arguments of counsel presented in the reports, that
the question did not receive any very elaborate consideration, either in the opinions of the court or in the arguments
of counsel."
So far, then, as the decision and reasoning of these three
'All

in 94 U. S.
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cases on this point is concerned, both are overruled; that
is to say, the general concurrent sovereignty theory is again
discarded. This opinion is a vigorous one, and though not
expressly, it inferentially is based upon the exclusivereserved powers theory.
Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489
(i886).
The State of Tennessee imposed a tax upon drummers
selling goods by sample. The payment of this tax was resisted by Robbins, who was selling for an Ohio business
house. Tax held unconstitutional.
The opinion starts out with a statement of a part of the
local concurrent powers theory, and yet it proceeds immediately to state a form of the doctrine of the silence of Congress which can flow from the exclusive theory alone; and
then shows in the strongest way that the local regulations
the states can make are only such as flow indirectly from
reserved powers, the most important of which are specified
in the opinion; and then proceeds even further to declare
that "no regulation can be made directly affecting interstate commerce," and that "in the matter of interstate commerce the United States are but one country, and are and
must be subject to one system of regulations," and "the
doctrine of the freedom of that commerce except as regulated
by Congress is so firmly established that it is unnecessary
to enlarge further upon the subject." From the language
of one theory it proceeds to the reasoning of the other.
It is an example of the confusion of the language of the
two theories in one opinion, though the fundamental reasoning is clear and strongly supports the exclusive-reserved
powers theory.
Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 125 U. S. 465
(0887).
The court declares unconstitutional a prohibition law of
Iowa forbidding carriers to transport liquors into the state.
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"It" (i.e., the state) "may adopt any measures tending,
even indirectly and remotely, to make the policy effective
until it passes the line of power delegated to Congress under
the Constitution. It cannot, without the consent of Congress, express or implied, regulate commerce between its
people and those of the other states of the Union in order
to effect its end, however desirable such a regulation might
be."
In other words, the court holds that a state cannot make
a direct regulation of commerce as a means to an end even
though the end be within the power of the state. This case
also supports the exclusive-reserved powers theory.
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. ioo (1889).
The question involved was the constitutionality of a prohibition law of Iowa forbidding the sale of liquors. The
court declared the statute unconstitutional in an opinion by
Mr. Chief-Justice Fuller which is worthy of especial note,
in which he says:
"The power to regulate commerce among the states is a
unit, but if particular subjects within its operation do not
require the application of a general or uniform system, the
states may legislate in regard to them with.a view t6 local
needs and circumstances until Congress otherwise directs;
but the power thus exercised by the states is not identical
in its extent with the power to regulate commerce among
the states. The power to pass laws in respect to internal
commerce, inspection laws, quarantine laws, and laws in
relation to bridges, ferries, and highways, belongs to the
class of powers pertaining to locality, essential to local intercommunication, to the progress and development of local
prosperity, and to the protection, the safety, and the welfare
of society, originally necessarily belonging to, and upon the
adoption of the Constitution reserved by, the states, except
so far as falling within the scope of a power confided to the
General Government. Where the subject requires a uniform
system as between the states, the power controlling it is
vested exclusively in Congress, and cannot be encroached
upon by the states; and where, in relation to the subject-
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matter, different rules may be suitable for different localities,
the states may exercise powers which, though they may be
said to partake of the nature of the power granted to the
General Government, are strictly not such, but are simply
local powers, which have full operation until and unless circumscribed by the action of Congress in effectuation of the
general power. Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia." 25
"It is explained that where state laws alleged to be regulations of commerce among the states have been sustained,
they were laws which related to bridges or dams across
streams, wholly within the state, or police or health laws, or
to subjects of a kindred nature not strictly of commercial
regulation."
"After all, it amounts to no more than drawing the line
between the exercise of power over commerce with foreign
nations and among the states and the exercise of power over
purely local commerce and local concerns."
"The conclusion follows that, as the grant of the power
to regulate commerce among the states, so far as one system
is required, is exclusive, the states cannot exercise that
power without the assent of Congress, and in the absence
of legislation it is left for the courts to determine when
state action does or does not amount to such exercise, or, in
other words, what is or is not a regulation of such commerce. When that is determined, controversy is at an end.
"These decisions rest upon the undoubted right of the
states of the Union to control their purely internal affairs,
in doing which they exercise powers not surrendered to the
National Government; but whenever the law of the *state
amounts essentially to a regulation of commerce with foreign nations or among the states, as it does when it inhibits,
directly or indirectly, the receipt of an imported commodity
=

12 How. 299.
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or its disposition before it has ceased to become an article
of trade between one state and another, or another country
and this, it comes in conflict with a power which, in this
particular, has been exclusively vested in the General Government, and is therefore void."
It will be noted here that, in the first place, the power to
regulate commerce among the states is declared a unit. It
is not divided up between two or three or four or forty-five
state sovereignties, but it is a unit, or, in other words, is in
Congress exclusively as an undivided unit power. Secondly,
it is held that the powers which the states wield over local
affairs, though resembling this power, are not such, but are
merely the reserved powers of the state. Thirdly, the line
between the two isdrawn sharply, and the minute it is determined that an attempted exercise of power by a state is not
an exercise of one of these reserved powers, but that it
crosses the line and attempts to use the power of Congress,
all controversy is at an end, for the attempt is necessarily
void.
This is a well-considered holding by this court clearly
supporting and expounding the principles which we set out
to show have been and should be the true guiding principles
under the commerce clause, to wit, those based on the exclusive-reserved powers theory. And yet even in this otherwise very clear-cut language may be seen traces of the
influence of the local concurrent sovereignty theory.
Uniform regulation is again confused with freedom from
local regulation, and the reference to things requiring uniformity of regulation as distinguished from things admitting of local regulation is in the language of the latter
theory, and is inconsistent with the opinion as a whole.
After it has once been decided that the power to regulate
interstate commerce is a unit power in Congress, and the
minute a state crosses the line and attempts to use that
power the attempt is void, why is there any necessity-nay,
further, why is it not unnecessary, inconsistent, and not permissible-to inquire further as to whether the line has been
crossed, and the exclusive, unit power of Congress attempted to be exercised in a local or a general matter?
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It should be sufficient to decide that the state has attempted to exercise a power which it has not; for if the
power is a unit, and therefore exclusive, in the hands of
Congress, it follows necessarily that every statute of a state
which is an immediate and direct regulation of interstate
commerce is void, whether it regulates it, locally or otherwise. This is the exclusive-reserved powers theory.
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 (189o).

The question was the constitutionality of an act of Kentucky requiring agents of foreign express companies to take
out a license and file a statement before doing business that
the company has at least one hundred and fifty thousand
dollars capital.
Opinion by Bradley, J.:
"It has frequently been laid down by this court that the
power of Congress over interstate commerce is as absolute
as it is over foreign commerce." . . . "No difference is
perceivable between the two."
"But the main argument in support of the decision of the
Court of Appeals is that the act in question is essentially a
regulation made in the fair exercise of the police power of
the state. But it does not follow that everything which the
legislature of a state may deem essential for the good order
of society_ and the well-being of its citizens can be set up
against the exclusive power of Cofigress to regulate the
operations of foreign and interstate commerce? This is
also the exclusive-reserved powers theory.
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289 (1893).
The question here was the constitutionality of an ordinance of the City of Titusville, Pennsylvania, requiring the
obtaining of a license and payment of a fee therefor for
soliciting orders and selling goods, when sold to other than
manufacturers and merchants.
In the opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, there are two things
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especially worthy of note: first, the statement, with approval
thereof, that Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District "affirms in
the strongest language the exclusive power of Congress over
interstate commerce;" and, second, the express ruling that
the police power cannot impose any direct burden upon interstate commerce. This case may likewise be classified as
supporting the eiclusive-reserved powers theory.
Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S.
204 (1893).
Opinion by Brown, J.:
Involved the power of a state to regulate tolls upon a
bridge connecting it with another state without the assent
of Congress and without the concurrence of the other state.
Held unconstitutional on the local concurrent powers theory.
The subject, however, is one which is essentially local,
obviously permits of local regulation, and does not require
uniform regulation throughout the country. On the theory
on which the opinion is based the statute should therefore
logically be held constitutional. But, on the other hand, the
subject well illustrates the necessity of freedom from local
control to prevent conflicts between states. And on the
exclusive-reserved powers theory the statute may be declared
unconstitutional logically. It is a direct regulation of interstate business and therefore void.
Held also that Munn v. Illinois, C. B. and Q. R. R. v.,
Iowa, and Peik v. C. and N. W. Ry., supra,26 were overruled
by Wabash, etc., Ry. v. Illinois, supra.27 Another nail is
thus driven in the coffin of the general concurrent powers
theory, on which those cases were based. We shall see that
it was not sufficient, however, to prevent the resurrection of
the theory in one later case. Local concurrent powers
theory.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S.

65o (1895).
The question was the constitutionality of an act of Georgia "To prescribe the duty of electric telegraph companies
:All in 94 U. S.
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as to receiving and transmitting despatches, to prescribe
penalties for violation thereof, and for other purposes."
The act prescribed a penalty of one hundred dollars for
breach of duty or failure to deliver message within one mile
of the station.
The court upheld the.statute in an opinion by Peckham,
J., in which he says:
"In one sense it affects the transmission of interstate
messages, because such transmission is not completed until
the message is delivered to the person to whom it is addressed, or reasonable diligence employed to deliver it."
"It is the duty of a telegraph company which receives a
message for transmission, directed to an individual at one
of its stations, to deliver that message to the person to whom
it is addressed with reasonable diligence and in good faith.
That is a part of its contract implied by taking the message
and receiving payment therefor.
"The statute in question is of a nature that is in aid of
the performance of a duty of the company that would exist
in the absence of any such statute, and it is in nowise obstructive of its duty as a telegraph company. It imposes a
penalty for the purpose of enforcing this general duty of
the company. The direction that the delivery of the message shall be made with impartiality and in good faith and
with due diligence is not in addition to the duty which it
would owe in the absence of such a statute. Can it be said
that the imposition of such a penalty for a violation of a
duty which the company owed by the general law of the
land is a regulation of or an obstruction to interstate commerce within the meaning of that clause of the Federal
Constitution under discussion? We think not."
"While the penalty of the present statute is quite ample
for a mere neglect to deliver in some cases, we cannot say
that it is so unreasonable as to be outside of and beyond the
jurisdiction of the state to enact."
The facts and opinion in this case have been given thus
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at length because this case is frequently insufficiently stated
and quoted, and a false impression of the true grounds of
the decision thereby given. It is often misquoted as though
it were merely a direct regulation.of the delivery of messages and imposing burdens thereupon. But such is not the
case. It is a statute establishing the rights and duties in
several respects of common carriers of messages. This is
strictly within the reserved powers of the states. Common
carriers derive their character as such from, and their rights
and duties as such are based upon, the laws of the states.
For instance, their liability for negligence and their right to
limit this liability depend upon state laws.
Also their right of eminent domain and their consequent
duty to serve the public impartially flow from state laws.
Hence the provisions in this act requiring the receiving of
messages, and transmission of the same with impartiality,
and the liability for cipher messages, are all so clearly within
the power of the state that no question is raised as to their
validity, even though they may indirectly affect interstate
business. The duty to deliver also flows from state laws,
and hence the court inquires only whether it may reasonably be considered that it is this power which has been exercised, and not a power to burden and regulate interstate
commerce.
The opinion seems to be based upon, and the decision is
consistent with, the exclusive-reserved power theory, though
the one provision as to the penalty must be admitted to be
very near the border-line of unconstitutionality.
A dissenting opinion is based on the case of Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton,28 but that case is distinguishable in that it attempted to regulate the delivery of
messages in other states, which was clearly beyond the
power of one state, and also in that it prescribed rules for
the order and preference to be given in the transmission of
messages, and thus directly regulated the conduct of the
business itself. For these reasons the statute in that case
was very properly held unconstitutional.
1122

U.
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Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142
(0895).
A statute of Illinois r.equired railtoads to stop passenger
trains at county-seats. Held unconstitutional as applied to
an interstate train. The train in question to make the stop
had to turn aside from the direct interstate route and run
three and a half miles to the station and back again, thus,
as said by the court, travelling seven miles which form no
part of its course.
The court says:
"This court is unanimously of opinion that this requirement is an unconstitutional hindrance and obstruction of.
interstate commerce and of the passage of the mails of the
United States."
"The state may doubtless compel the railroad to perform
the duty imposed by its charter of carrying passengers and
goods between its termini within the state. But so long, at
least, as that duty is adequately performed by the company,
the state cannot, under the guise of compelling its performance, interfere with the performance of paramount duties to
which the company has been subjected by the C6nstitution
and laws of the United States.
The state may make reasonable regulations to secure the
safety of passengers, even on interstate trains, while within
its borders. But the state can do nothing which will directly
burden or impede the interstate traffic of the company or
impair the usefulness of its facilities for such traffic."
Particular attention is called to the last sentence, that
the state cannot directly burden the interstate business of
the company.
Particular attention is also called to the case as a whole,
in view of a later case which will follow.
Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S.

299.

The question was the validity, as applied to an interstate
train, of a statute of Georgia making it a misdemeanor to
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run a train on Sunday. The court upheld the statute in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, in which he says:
"The well-settled rule is that if a statute purporting to
have been enacted to protect the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial relation to those subjects, or is a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts
to so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
In our opinion there is nothing in the legislation in question
which suggests that it was enacted with the purpose to
regulate interstate commerce, or with any other purpose
than to prescribe a rule of civil duty for all who, on the
Sabbath day, are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
state."
"Local laws of the character mentioned have their source
in the powers which the states reserved and never surrendered to Congress of providing for the public health, the
public morals, and the public safety, and are not within.the
meaning of the Constitution, and considered in their own
nature, regulations of interstate commerce simply because,
for a limited time or to a limited extent, they cover the field
occupied by those engaged in such commerce."
Two points are worthy of notice here. One is that a
statute purporting to be an exercise of an admitted power,
but having no real relation to that power, and being really
an invasion of the power of Congress, is invalid. This is
the principle involved to some extent in the preceding case,
where the court inquires as to whether the statute is reasonably within or "beyond the jurisdiction of the state to
enact."
This we will see later was distorted into a new theory of
the reasonable exercise of the power of the states. Whether
a statute has any reasonable relation to an admitted power,
or under color thereof really exercises another power, is,
however, as we shall endeavor to point out, quite a different
question from whether an admitted power is exercised to a
reasonable or unreasonable degree; for where the power
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exists the degree of reasonableness of its exercise is for the
legislature alone, and not for the courts.
The second point is that the decision is distinctly based
upon the reserved powers theory, and it is expressly said
that "local laws -of the character mentioned have their
source in the powers which the states reserved and never
surrendered to Congress," etc. The case may therefore be
said to rest on the exclusive-reserved powers theory.
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. v. Solan, 169
U. S. 133 (1897).
The question here involved was the constitutionality of a
statute of Iowa prohibiting common carriers from limiting
their liability for negligence.
The statute is sustained in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Gray, from which we quote at some length, inasmuch as it
will be seen that the statute is "strictly within the scope of
the local law," and not a regulation of commerce, and that
it explains more fully the principles by which we saw in
Western Union Tel. Co. v. James, supra, that the general
duties and liabilities of carriers, including the duty to deliver, rest upon state law. He says:
"Railroad corporations, like all other corporations and
persons doing business within the territorial jurisdiction of
a state, are subject to its law. It is in the law of the state
that provisions are to be found concerning the rights and
duties of common carriers of persons or of goods, and the
measure by which injuries resulting from their failure to
perform their obligations may be prevented or redressed.
Persons travelling on interstate trains are as much entitled,
while within a state, to the protection of that state, as those
who travel on domestic trains. A carrier exercising his
calling within a paiticular state, although engaged in the
business of interstate commerce, is answerable, according
to the law of the state, for acts of non-feasance committed
within its limits. If he fail to deliver goods to the proper
consignee at the right time and place, or if by negligence
in transportation he inflicts injury upon the person of a
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passenger brought from another state, the right of action
for the consequent damage is given by the local law.
"It is equally within the power of the state to prescribe
the safeguards and precautions foreseen to be necessary and
proper to prevent by anticipation those wrongs and injuries
which, after they have been inflicted, the state has the power
to redress and to punish. The rules prescribed for the construction of railroads and for their management and operation, designed to protect persons and property otherwise
endangered by their use, are strictly within the scope of the
local law. They are not in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, although they control in some degree the
conduct and the liability of those engaged in such commerce.
So long as Congress has not legislated upon the particular
subject they are rather to be regarded as legislation in aid
of such commerce and as a rightful exercise of the police
power of the state to regulate the relative rights and duties
of all persons and corporations within its limits."
"The statute now in question, so far as it concerns liability for injuries happening within the state of Iowvawhich is the only matter presented for decision in this case
-clearly comes within the same principles." This is also
the exclusive-reserved powers theory.
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. v. Hober, 169 U.
S_613 (1897).
Kansas, to protect her cattle from contagious diseases,
made it a misdemeanor for any person, between February
ist and December Ist, to drive into or through, or keep in
any county, any cattle capable of communicating Texas
fever, and making any person who should do so liable to
any person for damages by reason of communication of the
disease.
The statute was sustained in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Harlan on the ground that it was a proper exercise by the
state of its reserved police power to protect the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety, and to provide for
the redress of wrongs within its limits.
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The statute in this case is to be distinguished from the
statute in Railroad Company v. Husen, supra.2 9 There the
statute applied to all cattle, whether diseased or not. It was
held to exceed a proper exercise of the police power, and to
amount to a regulation of commerce. Here the statute
applied only to cattle capable of causing infection, and gave
a remedy only for infection actually caused. This is also the
exclusive-reserved powers theory.
Lake Shore and Mich. So. R. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S.

285 (1898).
This case should be especially noted. It is the climax of
the confusion of reasoning which we have seen accumulating
in the foregoing review of the cases. The decision of the
court and the general principles underlying the opinion of
the majority are fraught with the possibility of so much
interference with interstate and foreign commerce by the
states as to make it a matter of grave concern -whether the
court has not erred.
The decision is flatly inconsistent with previous decisions.
It was rendered by a bare majority of one. It is based on
the twice discarded general concurrent powers theory, which
is revived in the majority opinion.
,Both the decision and the reasoning on which it is based
are hotly controverted by the minority. The very cases
quoted by the majority in support of their position are
shown by the minority to be against them and are quoted
back at them. It is a crowning illustration of the disagreement to which the confusion of the theories leads, and
proof, if any were needed, that *confusion of reasoning
means inconsistency and uncertainty of decision. It fully
justifies distinguishing the theories clearly, and the belief
expressed at the outset of this article, that to do so would
greatly clarify the subject.,
The case was an action brought in Ohio against the railroad company to recover a penalty-under a statute relating
to railroads, providing:
95 U. S. 465.
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"Each company shall cause three, each way, of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily,
Sundays excepted, to stop at a station, city, or village, containing over three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient
to receive and let off passengers," and providing a penalty
for failure to comply.
The railroad company ran three or more trains, but
stopped only one, the others being interstate trains, which
it refused to stop.
A judgment against the company for the penalty of one
hundred dollars was sustained, but the court was divided
five to four, and two most able and convincing dissenting
opinions were filed.
Notwithstanding the recent more conservative opinions
of the court which we have just seen, the majority opinion,
which is by Mr. Justice Harlan, takes exceedingly radical
ground, and reverts to the discarded general concurrent
powers theory of Mr. Justice Taney.
Indeed, the positions taken are so radical that it is necessary to quote from the opinion at some length and comment
upon it as we proceed. In the majority opinion the court
says:
"The average time required to stop a train of cars and
receive and let off passengers is three minutes.
"The number of villages in Ohio containing three thousand inhabitants through which the above trains passed on
the day named was thirteen."
"It is insisted by counsel that these (i.e., Henington v.
Georgia, supra, and other cases cited) and observations to
the same effect in different cases show that the police powers
of the states, when exerted with reference to matters more
or less connected with interstate commerce, are restricted
in their exercise, so far as the National Constitution is concerned, to regulations pertaining to health, morals, or
safety of the public, and do not embrace regulations designed merely to promote the public convenience.
" This is an erroneous view of the adjudications of this
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court. While cases to which counsel refer involve the
validity of state laws having reference directly to the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, in no one of
them was there any occasion to determine whether the
police powers of the states extended to regulations incidentaly affecting interstate commerce but which were designed onlyto promote the public convenience or the general
welfare. There are, however, numerous decisions by this
court to the effect that the states may legislate with reference simply to the public convenience, subject, of course,
to -the condition that such legislation be not inconsistent
with the National Constitution, nor with any act of Congress passed in pursuance of that instrument, nor in derogation of any right granted or secured by it. As the question
now presented is one of great impoftance, it will be well to
refer to some cases of the latter class." This contains the
keynote of the whole opinion-to wit, the principle that the
legislative power of the states extends to any matters de-

signed "to promote the public convenience or the general
welfare."
It is difficult to see where there"are any limits to such a
power short of sovereignty. Whatever a state legislature
thinks for the public convenience or general welfare it can
do. This is nothing more nor less than the view set out by
Chief-Justice Taney in the License Cases, supra, when he
says:
"But what are the police powers of a state? They are
nothing more nor less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions.
And whether a state passes a quarantine law, or a law to
punish offences or to establish courts of justice, or requiring
certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce
within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same
power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power
to govern men and things within the limits of its dominions."
"And when the validity of a state law making regulations of commerce is drawn into question in a judicial tri-

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COMMERCE.

bunal, the authority to pass it cannot be made to depend
upon the motives that may be supposed to have influenced
the legislature, nor can the court inquire whether it was
intended to guard the citizens of the state from pestilence
and disease, or to make regulations of commerce for the
interest and convenience of trade."
We are thus cast back upon the general concurrent powers
theory of Chief-Justice Taney, a theory which those of his
associates who did not adhere to the exclusive-reserved
powers theory of Chief-Justice Marshall soon materially
modified into the local concurrent powers theory. In fact,
it was so completely discarded that after the time of ChiefJustice Taney we are not able to trace it until we come to
the three cases in 94 U. S., which were pronounced but ill
considered, and are overruled in Wabash v. Illinois3 0 and
in Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky. 31
But let us examine the cases which are cited to support
this public convenience, general welfare theory. The first
32
case cited in the opinion is that of Gilman v. Philadelphia,
supra.
But this was the case of a bridge entirely within the limits
of the state of Pennsylvania, which therefore had jurisdiction over it by virtue of its reserved powers. Of course, it
could exercise this power for the convenience or welfare
of the people. Having the power, how else should it exercise it? But there is nothing in the opinion from which
even the inference could be drawn that the state can do
anything which would promote the general convenience or
welfare.
And the same is true of Pound v. Turck,3 3 which is the
next case cited in the opinion. This was a case of control
of piers and booms for lumbering, over which, together with
wharves, etc., the states have reserved powers.
34
The next case cited is Escanaba Company v.. Chicago,
S118 U. S. 557.
154 U. S. 204.

U3

Wall. 713, 729.

95
io7U.U.S.S.459,
678,464.
683.
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which is also a bridge case, involving the regulation of the
bridges over the Chicago River.
Some of the language of that case standing alone is as
broad as the language of the present opinion. But it is
immediately coupled with reference to roads, canals, bridges,
and ferries. It is used in a case where the subject-to wit,
a bridge-is admittedly a subject over which the state has
jurisdiction, and where the necessity of providing for the
convenience of the people using the bridge was the immediate cause of this exercise of local jurisdiction over the
bridge.
The opinion read as a whole cannot be construed to mean
that a state can make direct regulations of interstate commerce, or use any other power granted to Congress, to
promote "the convenience and prosperity of its people."
To Congress is given power "to provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States." But
this means nothing more than that the powers granted to
Congress may be used for that purpose. The "welfare
clause" alone is not a source of power, and no statute of
Congress has ever been based thereon.
Similarly the necessity of providing for the general welfare of its people by a state is not itself .a source of power,
and state statutes cannot be based on that alone; they must
be based on some reserved power of the states.
Therefore to say that the state could enforce the regulation of trains in this case because it promoted the general
welfare begs the real question, and assumes that the state
was exercising to promote the general welfare a power.
which it possessed. If on examination it was found that the
state was attempting to exercise a power which it did not
have, a power which had been granted to Congress exclusively, the whole argument crumbles.
The real question in the case, whether the state was
attempting to regulate interstate commerce, and, if so,
whether that power belongs exclusively to Congress or not,
is thus obscured.
The argument also overlooks the essentially protective
character of the police power. This is perhaps the reason it
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expands it into sovereignty, and reverts to the twice discarded general concurrent sovereignty idea.
That being the case, it necessarily overlooks the great
necessity of freedom from local regulations and the frequent
decisions of the court, already noted, which hold that the
transportation of passengers cannot be locally regulated, and
that the police power cannot be used to directly regulate
commerce.
Continuing, the court says: "In what has been said we
assumed that the statute is not in itself unreasonable; that
is, has appropriate relation to the public convenience, does
not go beyond the necessities of the case, and is not directed
against interstate commerce."
"As the cases above cited show, and as appears from
other cases, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a
state enactment is always an element in the general inquiry
by the court whether such legislation encroaches upon
national authority, or is to be deemed a legitimate exertion
of the power of the state to protect public interests or to
promote public convenience.
"In our judgment the assumption that the statute of
Ohio was not directed against interstate commerce but is a
reasonable provision for the public convenience is not
unwarranted."
This is adequately answered in a dissenting opinion
quoted below. The reasonableness of the extent to which
a power which exists is exercised is never for the court, but
for the legislature. It is an entirely different matter for the
court to inquire whether in a given case the legislature may
reasonably be said to have exercised a power which it had,
or under cover thereof to have really attempted to exercise
a power which it did not have.
Again the court says:
"In the absence of legislation by Congress, it would be
going very far to hold that such an enactment as the one
before us was in itself a regulation of interstate commerce.
It was for the state to take into consideration all the cir-
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cumstances affecting passenger travel within its limits, and
as far as practicable make such regulations as were just to
all who might pass over the road in question. It was entitled, of course, to provide for the convenience of persons
desiring to travel from one point to another in the state on
domestic trains. But it was not bound to ignore the convenience of those who desired to travel from places within
the state to places beyond its limits, or the convenience of
those outside of the state who wished to come into it. Its
statute is in aid of interstate commerce of that character.
It was not compelled to look only to the convenience of those
who desired to pass through the state without stopping."
In the above, after saying in one line that the regulation
in this case was not in itself a regulation of interstate commerce, the court, in the next line, say that it was competent
for the state to take into consideration all the circumstances
affecting travel within its limits and to make such regulations as were just to all who might pass over the road. This
is flatly contradictory. If the state regulated interstate
travel for the convenience of its own people wanting to take
interstate journeys, as admittedly by this statute it did, it
regulated interstate coinmerce, for interstate travel is interstate commerce. In so doing it interfered with the right of
the people of other states to be transported entirely through
the state with entire freedom from control by-that state of
the conduct of the business of their transportation. On
this decision every state could stop every train in every hamlet in the state, and there could be no through express trains
for the convenience of parties desiring to reach distant
points in the course of interstate travel. If it be answered
that this would never happen, reply may be made in the
language of Chief-Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Maryland,
smpra,83 as follows:
"It will not meet the argument to say that this state of
things will never be produced; that the good sense of the
states is a safeguard against it. The Constitution has not
confided this subject to that good sense. It is placed else12

Wheaton,

419.

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COMMERCE.

where. The question is, where does the power reside, not
how, or, probably, would it be abused? The power claimed
by the state is, in its nature, in conflict with that given to
Congress; and the greater or less extent to which it may be
exercised does not enter into the inquiry concerning its
existence."
A number of other cases are quoted or cited in the
opinion in support of the decision.
It is unnecessary to go into these or the opinion at further length, but it is worthy of especial note that Mr.
Justice Shiras, with whom concur Brewer, J., and Peckham,
J., in an elaborate dissenting opinion, takes up the various
cases which the majority rely upon and shows that they do
not support the principle claimed by the majority and do not
support the decision rendered, but quite the contrary. He
quotes quite freely as applicable to the present case Hall v.
De Cuir, supra,3 6 to the effect that "State legislation which
seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce,
or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon
the exclusive power of Congress." He quotes back at the
majority many cases holding clearly either that the power in
Congress is exclusive, or at least that state regulations of
interstate transportation are void.
Lack of space prevents going into these, but the following
reply to the reasoning of the majority may be quoted:
"Some observations may be ventured on the reasoning
employed in the opinion of the court. It is said:
"'In what has been said we have assumed that that
statute is not in itself unreasonable. In our judgment this
assumption is not unwarranted. The requirement that a
railroad company whose road is operated within the state
shall cause three, each way, of its regular trains carrying
passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to
stop at any station, city, or village, of three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers, so far from being unreasonable, will subserve the
public interest.'
"95 U. S. 485.

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER COMMERCE.

"But the question of the reasonableness of a public
statute is never open to the courts. It was not open even
to the Supreme Court of the state of Ohio to say whether
the act in question was reasonable or otherwise. Much less
does the power of the state legislature of Ohio to pass an
act regulating a railroad corporation depend upon the
judgment or opinion of this court as to the reasonableness
of such an act.
"And again: 'It was for the state of Ohio to take into
consideration all of the circumstances affecting passenger
travel within its limits, and, as far as practicable, make such
regulations as were just to all who might pass over the road
in question, etc., etc.'
" It was, I respectfully submit, just such action on the
part of the state of Ohio, and just such reasoning made to
support that action, that are forbidden by the Constitution
of the United States and by the decisions of this court,
hereinbefore cited. If each and every state, through which
these interstate highways run, could take into consideration
all of the circumstances affecting passenger travel within
its limits, and make such regulations as, in the opinion of
the legislature, are 'just and for the convenience of its own
people,' then we should have restored the confusion that
existed in commercial transactions before the adopting of
the Constitution, and thus would be overruled those numerous decisions of this court- nullifying state legislation proceeding on such propositions."
"It is fallacious, as I think, to contend that the Ohio
legislation in question was enacted to promote the public
interest. That can only mean the public interest of the
state of Ohio, and the reason why such legislation is pernicious and unsafe is because it is based upon a discrimination in favor of local interests and is hostile to the larger
public interest and convenience involved in interstate
commerce."
The impossibility of distinguishing this case from the
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case of Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, supra,3 7 and the
failure of the majority even to attempt to do so is pointed
out. That is the case in which a train was compelled to go
three miles from its course and back again to. stop at a
county-seat. The statute compelling it was held unconstitutional. Of the majority opinion in respect to this case
Mr. justice Shiras says:
"Beyond the bare allegation that the case of Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois 38 is not consistent with the views ex-

pressed in the present case, no attempt is made to compare
or reconcile the principles involved in the two cases.'"
"On what, then, does the court's opinion rely to distinguish the Illinois case from the present case? Merely that
the through train in the one case was obliged to go out of
its direct route some three or four miles, while in the other
the obligation is to stop at towns through which the trains
pass. But what was the reason why this court held that
the Illinois statute was void as an interference with interstate commerce? Was not the delay thus caused the sole
reason? And is there any difference between a delay caused
by having to go a few miles out of a direct course in a
single instance, and one caused by having to stop at a
number of unimportant towns ?"
To this may be added the fact that the train in the present
case was compelled to stop at thirteen small towns at a total
loss of thirty-nine minutes, whereas in the former case the
train lost only about fifteen minutes. There is no difference
in the power used to compel the one and the power used to
compel the other. The inconsistency of the two decisions is
so obvious that nothing can be said to make it more so.
And if to this is added the inconsistency of the present
decision with the series of cases holding that interstate
transportation rates and charges cannot be controlled or
"163 U. S. 142.
SIbid.
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interfered with by a state, -nor a long and short haul regulation made, nor interstate commerce taxed or burdened, and
that interstate commerce cannot be discriminated against in
any way whatever in favor of local commerce, it will be seen
that the necessity for removing inconsistency and uncertainty of decision from this field of law is great.
But even far beyond this in importance, and fraught with
far more danger to the larger interests of the nation, is the
possibility, inherent in the general concurrent powers theory,
which the majority of the court adopted in this case, of
restoring by future decisions confirming the right of the
states to make various regulations of interstate commerce,
and of interstate transportation in particular, that conflict
of local interest and confusion of regulations from which
the Constitution designed to free commerce.
In addition to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Shiras
there is 'a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice White wherein,
in a few words, he goes straight to the point. He shows
that the statute, under the guise of a police regulation for
local convenience, in fact imposes a direct burden on interstate commerce. Also that it discriminates against such
commerce 'in favor of local commerce. For these reasons
he holds it unconstitutional.
This with the major premise, implied rather than expressed; is the syllogistic logic of the exclusive theory, and
illustrates the way in which that theory permits of the application of the syllogism. In general, the exclusive-reserved
powers syllogism is:
All direct regulations of interstate or foreign commerce
by a state are unconstitutional.
The statute (in any case) in question is a direct regulation of interstate or foreign commerce.
The statute in question, therefore, is unconstitutional.
Granted the major premise, the one question centres in
the minor premise.
In the present case the object and effect is to control the
running of interstate trains and the handling of interstate
business in favor of local convenience of passengers who
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may desire to take an interstate journey from a point without the state of Ohio to a point within, or from a point
within the state to a point without. The nature and the
object of the statute was, therefore, control of interstate
commerce. It does not make this any the less true to say
that the object was the local convenience of the people of
Ohio and adjacent states, because the local convenience of
theirs to be promoted was convenience in interstate journeys
to or from Ohio.
Further, if the nature of the power be examined, it is
seen at once that the state attempted to regulate directly
the conduct of the business of interstate transportation of
passengers. The power attempted to be exercised being,
therefore, the power to directly control interstate commerce,
it can make no difference whether the state attempted to
exercise the power as an end or only as- a means to an end.
In either case, it attempted to exercise a power which it does
not possess. The application of the syllogism to this case
is, therefore:
All direct regulations of interstate or foreign commerce
by a state are unconstitutional.
The statute of Ohio in this case is a direct regulation of
interstate commerce.
The statute of Ohio in this case is unconstitutional.
In contrast with the simplicity of this reasoning. and the
freedom from local regulations secured forever by this
theory, must be placed the confusion and inconsistency resulting from the two other theories, and particularly from
the theory of the present case, which is the general concurrent pouters theory.
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540
(1902).

(Question at issue not in point.)
Opinion by Harlan, J.:
"The question of constitutional law to which we have
referred cannot be disposed of by saying that the statute
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in question may be referred to- what are called the police
powers of the state." . . . "But as the Constitution of the
United States is the supreme law of the land," . . . "a
statute of a state, even when avowedly enacted in the exercise of its police powers, must yield to that law. No right
granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States
can be impaired or destroyed by a state enactment, whatever
may be the source from which the power to pass such enactment may have been derived."
This is a decided modification of the position in regard
to the police power taken by Mr. Justice Harlan in the
preceding case.
CarnpagnieFrancaisev. Board of Health, 186 U. S.
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(1902).

A law of Louisiana empowered the Board of Health to
exclude healthy persons from an infected district. The
board excluded four hundred and eight healthy immigrants
brought over on a steamship company's vessel bound for
New Orleans. The constitutionality of this law was attacked as a regulation of commerce. Upheld.
Opinion by White, J.:
"In other words, the power exists until Congress has
acted to incidentally regulate by health and quarantine laws,
even although interstate and foreign commerce is affected."

"True it is, as said in Morgan v. Louisiana: 'In all
cases of this kind it has been repeatedly held that, when the
question is raised whether the state statute is a just exercise
of state power or is intended by roundabout means to invade
the domain of Federal authority, this court will look into
the operation and effect of the statute to discern its purpose.
See Henderson v. Mayor of New York,3 9 Chy Lung v.
Freeman,40 Cannon v. New Orleans.' "41
'92 U. S. 259.

Ibid. 275.
"20 Wall. 587.
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Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902).
The decision is not of special interest. Opinion by Harlan, J.:
"Again, the acknowledged police powers of-a state cannot
legitimately be exerted so as to defeat or impair a right
secured by the National Constitution, any more than to
defeat or impair a statute passed by Congress in pursuance
of the powers granted to it.

Gibbons v. Ogden,42 Missouri,

Kansas and Texas Railway Co. v. Haber." 4
If Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion in the Lake Shore,
etc., v. Ohio case had applied this doctrine the state of Ohio
would not have been permitted to impair the right of untrammelled transportation through the state secured to interstate passengers by the National Constitution.
In the above review of cases it has been necessary to omit
numerous decisions on taxation and a number on license
requirements and regulation of rates and charges. These
are, for the most part, decided on the local concurrent
powers theory, to the effect that exclusive power over those
subjects is vested in Congress, as in the typical cases of these
kinds which are included in the above.
But as pointed out in the cases given as types, the decisions are in reality inconsistent with that theory, and have
been brought about by underlying considerations of national
expediency. These cases are all cases where that theory and
the exclusive-reserved powers theory lead to opposite results.
They comprise the greater number of such cases. Their
omission from this review of the cases in order to avoid
repetition should not lessen the weight and consideration
to be given the important fact that, with few exceptions, in
all cases where these two theories conflict the decisions are
consistent only with tile exclusive-reserved powers theory.
*q Wheat. 1 210.
'3 i69 U. S. ( 13. 625, 626, and authorities
cited.
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Other cases also of interest have been necessarily omitted.
Those cases have been given which show the origin of
the three theories and which most conspicuously trace their
course down through the opinions of the court. The
omitted cases add to the confusion of reasoning, which is
still further increased when the dissenting opinions, of which
there are a very large number, are gone into.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the cases reviewed show
the origination and existence in the opinions of three distinct
theories, and prove that these have been the cause of considerable confusion. They furnish abundant illustration
that the recognition of the three as distinct theories and the
elimination of two of them would clarify the subject. They
show that the actual decisions of the court have practically
followed one theory to the.almost complete exclusion of the
other two, notwithstanding their persistency on the face of
the opinions, and that simplicity of reasoning and consistency of decision will be greatly promoted should the court
specifically declare the eliminatioA of these two theories and
its adoption of the exclusive-reserved powers theory alone.
James S. Rogers.

